





	Karl Marx (see MARX, KARL) argued that workers in a capitalist economy are both exploited by the owners of capital and coerced or forced to work for them (1975 [1844]: 274; 1971 [1894]: 819) (see COERCION; EXPLOITATION).  Both claims have attracted considerable discussion without consensus, but it would seem that the latter claim, that workers are coerced into accepting offers of employment from their employers, is demonstrably false, if one accepts recent theories of coercion.  20th-century scholarship has tended to associate coercion exclusively with the use of threats, and has correspondingly held that offers cannot coerce those who receive them.  This has prompted some to rethink the nature of coercion, and to defend the possibility of coercive offers.  This dispute is of interest both for the light it sheds on political economy and the nature of employment relations (see EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES; WORK, NATURE AND VALUE OF) as well as on our understanding of the nature of coercion.
	According to the exemplary account of coercion of Robert Nozick, coercion is an attempt by one agent to induce another to act by proposing to alter the consequences of that agent’s actions by means of a threat. Nozick distinguishes threats from other sorts of conditional proposals (e.g., offers) by whether the threatener proposes to attach consequences to the recipient’s actions that are worse for her than they would be in the “normal and expected course of events” (1969: 447). 
	This understanding of coercion has helped advocates of free markets to defend them as bulwarks against coerced labor, since it holds that one cannot be coerced except by the use of threats.  In response, some philosophers have attempted to vindicate Marx’s claim that capitalism coerces workers by arguing that offers can in some circumstances be coercive.  David Zimmerman, for one, argues that wage offers from capitalists to employees can coerce those employees when  “(1) an alternative pre-proposal situation workers would strongly prefer to the actual one is technologically and economically feasible when the offer is made, and (2) capitalists prevent workers from having at least one of these feasible alternative pre-proposal situations” (1981: 145).  In this situation, employees will accept such wage offers as the best alternative available to them, but such offers may be regarded as constraining, since the appeal of such offers may be due to capitalists cutting off of other alternatives through the exercise of their monopoly over the means of production.  Others who argue that market offers can be coercive include Cudd (2006: 125-31), Held (1972), and McGregor (1988-89).
  	Lawrence Alexander (1983) criticizes Zimmerman’s proposal, arguing that Zimmerman cannot successfully specify the set of “technologically and economically feasible” alternative situations in a way that usefully distinguishes between coercive and non-coercive offers.  Capitalists could, of course, transfer all of their capital to workers gratis, which presumably is a situation that workers would prefer to the situation in which the capitalist retains ownership of his capital.  Because the capitalist resists making such a transfer, and thus “prevents” the workers from having at least one preferable pre-proposal situation, essentially all capitalist wage offers would count as coercive on Zimmerman’s account.  Such a conclusion would undermine the critical and explanatory function Zimmerman intends his account to perform.
	One might see the issue of coercive wage offers as subsidiary to the question of whether offers are ever coercive.  While the idea of “an offer you can’t refuse” makes sense to many people, one may suspect that the reason that someone might be unable to refuse an offer is that it comes attached to a tacit (or even explicit) threat of adverse consequences if the offer is not accepted.  Biconditional proposals containing a combination of a threat and an offer have been designated “throffers,” (Goodin 1998), and theorists have suggested that their coerciveness depends principally on the potency of the threat, rather than the allure of the offer by itself.  The possibility that throffers coerce does not, however, imply that offers alone could count as coercive.
	Debates over whether employment offers can coerce shade into several additional related issues.  One is whether judgments about coercion depend on other, prior normative judgments.  Advocates of non-normative accounts, such as Zimmerman, claim that it is an advantage of such accounts that they are able to determine whether coercion has occurred without having first to answer more contentious normative questions (e.g., whether capitalism distributes the fruits of labor justly).  By contrast, the most prominent contemporary theories of coercion (e.g. Wertheimer 1987) make judgments of coercion dependent on other, prior normative judgments.  For example, in his defense of free markets, Nozick argues that when some agents act in a way that constrains another’s action, the question of whether the constrained actor acts voluntarily “depends upon whether these others had the right to act as they did” (1974: 262).
	A second issue concerns the relationship between exploitation and coercion.  Most contemporary discussion of the problems with capitalist employment relations concerns whether they are exploitative rather than coercive (e.g., Snyder 2010; Wood 1995; Zwolinski, 2007).  Zimmerman (1983) argues that exploitation under capitalism may not be clearly distinct from coercion:  the more exploitative an accepted offer is (that is, the greater the share of the value added by a worker’s labor that the employer retains as profit), the more likely that there is an alternative pre-proposal scenario that workers would prefer, and which capitalists are keeping workers from obtaining. 
	Third, there is a question of whether coercion should be understood always as the act of particular agents, or whether it can arise as an effect of certain social structures, independent of any particular intention to coerce.  In free-market capitalism, when there are numerous competing employers, it is difficult for any one employer to constrain the possibilities open to particular workers, since there are likely to be other employment offers for them to choose among.  Thus, analyses of coercion that focus on the actions of particular coercing agents, as Zimmerman’s does (at least initially), will find few interactions between an employer and employee fit their criteria as coercive.  However, an account that considers how the structure of capitalism allows the owners of capital to monopolize and restrict access to land and material resources might find it easier to regard wage offers as coercive, insofar as it is the structure of capitalism, rather than the intentions of the capitalists, that prevents workers from obtaining the resources needed to achieve a better alternative to the capitalist’s wage offer (Cudd 2006: 130-136).  
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